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531 
PROTECTING PATENT OWNERS FROM 
INFRINGEMENT BY THE STATES: WILL THE 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
RESTORATION ACT OF 1999 FINALLY SATISFY 
THE COURT? 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
After years of hard work, you’ve finally done it.  After eight years 
of college and years spent working in the laboratory, your hard work has 
finally paid off.  Standing in the shower, washing away your sleepiness, 
you finally experienced that wonderful “Eureka” feeling.  You knew the 
idea that popped into your head had never popped into the head of an-
other.  You just solved the problem you had been working on for years.  
Your invention will work and it will work well.  You see your patent at-
torney.  Eighteen months later, you finally have a patent for your inven-
tion.  That is when your dream begins to unravel. 
Unfortunately, the only significant markets for your invention are 
the state and federal governments.  Maybe it was a method of testing au-
tomobile emissions.1  Maybe it was a tidal flow system.2  Whatever your 
invention, it turns out that a state government is using it without your 
permission and without paying you for its use.  Outraged, you immedi-
ately see your patent attorney and file a lawsuit against the infringing 
state.3  Not long after your complaint is filed, your attorney calls you to 
inform you that a federal district court judge has dismissed your case be-
cause the state has immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.  
Your attorney also informs you that you can not sue in state court be-
                                                          
 1. See Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 2. See Jacobs Wind Elec. Co., Inc. v. Florida Dep’t of Transp.,  919 F.2d 726 (Fed. Cir. 
1990). 
 3. “Except as otherwise provided in [the Patent Act], whoever without authority makes, uses, 
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United 
States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”  35 U.S.C. 
§ 271 (1994) (emphasis added).  “A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of 
his patent.”  35 U.S.C. § 281 (1994) (emphasis added). 
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cause the state courts can not hear patent infringement cases.4  It appears 
your hard work and creative efforts are for naught.  The state can in-
fringe your patent and there is nothing you can do about it. 
Unfortunately, the situation described above reflects the state of the 
law today.5  Under the Eleventh Amendment, states6 have long enjoyed 
immunity from suits brought by private citizens in federal courts.7  This 
immunity, with only a few exceptions,8 effectively renders Congress in-
capable of holding states to the same standards as it holds the federal 
government and private actors.9  As states begin to participate in the 
public markets not as governing bodies, but as businesses seeking to 
                                                          
 4. Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising under the Patent Act.  28 
U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994).  Patent owners cannot seek relief for patent infringement in state court.  
Mavco, Inc. v. Hampden Sales Ass’n, 77 N.Y.S.2d 510, 515 (1st Dep’t. 1948).  However, state rem-
edies, if any, would still be available.  But see Scott D. Nelson, Big Brother Stole My Patent: The 
Expansion of the Doctrine of State Sovereign Immunity and the Dramatic Weakening of Federal 
Patent Law, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 271, 307-309 (2000) (explaining why state courts are ill-
equipped to decide on issues related to patent infringement). 
 5. See infra notes 33-163 and accompanying text. 
 6. The Eleventh Amendment applies only to states and arms or instrumentalities of the 
states.  U.S. Const. amend XI. Municipalities and counties are not “arms of the state.”  N.M. Pater-
son & Sons, Ltd. v. City of Chicago, 176 F. Supp. 323, 324-25 (N.D. Ill. 1959).  Universities are 
arms of the state.  Kersavage v. University of Tenn., 731 F. Supp. 1327, 1328 (E.D. Tenn. 1989).  
The test as to what constitutes an arm of the state is somewhat unclear.  Much of the analysis focus-
es on whether the entity in question has a direct fiscal impact on the state treasury.  See Lake Coun-
try Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 400-01 (1979).  This direct-impact 
test essentially asks whether the entity’s liability, when sued, will fall to the state.  S.J. Groves & 
Sons Co. v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 268 F. Supp. 568, 574 (D.N.J. 1967).  Even where the ac-
tion is not brought directly against the state, the Eleventh Amendment will apply whenever the state 
is the real party in interest.  Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974).  See also Alex E. Rogers, 
Note, Clothing State Governmental Entities with Sovereign Immunity: Disarray in the Eleventh 
Amendment Arm-of-the-State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1243 (1992). 
 7. States have enjoyed this immunity at least since the ratification of the Eleventh Amend-
ment and the Supreme Court’s liberal interpretation of it in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).  
See infra notes 45-52 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra notes 130-152 and accompanying text. 
 9. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment “has put the federal judi-
ciary in the unseemly position of exempting the States from compliance with laws that bind every 
other legal actor in our Nation.” Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 248 (1985) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting).  See Sulaiman M. Qazi, Comment,  Licensed to Steal: Has Sovereign Im-
munity Gone Too Far?, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 779, 804 (1999) (stating the “states are held to a 
different standard of liability than private patent holders”).  Justice Frankfurter, in describing Elev-
enth Amendment immunity, referred to it as an “exceptional freedom from legal responsibility.”  
Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 388 (1939). 
  “Because states reap the benefits of patent laws, these laws should be applied equally to 
states, companies, and individuals.” Kristen Healey, Comment, The Scope of Eleventh Amendment 
Immunity from Suits Arising Under Patent Law After Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 
1735, 1772-73 (1998).  But see College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense 
Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 685 (1999) (“In the sovereign-immunity context . . . ‘[e]venhandedness’ between 
individuals and States is not to be expected.”). 
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make a profit,10 the doctrine of state sovereign immunity becomes par-
ticularly troublesome.11  Immunity for states acting in a proprietary ca-
pacity allows states to compete with private companies free of the re-
straints normally associated with patent law and other federal 
regulations.12 
State sovereign immunity leaves patent owners in an unenviable 
position:13 holding the valuable right to exclude all others,14 but unable 
to enforce that right against state infringers.15  Worse yet, issues sound-
ing in patent law and suits to recover damages for patent infringement 
can be heard only before the federal courts,16 leaving no adequate reme-
dy17 available in the state courts.18 
                                                          
 10. States are increasingly acting in ways that are “functionally indistinguishable” from pri-
vate actors in the market.  Karl Manheim, New-Age Federalism and the Market Participant Doc-
trine, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 559, 570-71 (1990). 
 11. “Governmental growth has given rise to new entities which contain qualities of both state 
actors and private business.  As these entities multiply and change, the immunity question returns to 
the forefront.”  Jennifer A. Winking, Note, Eleventh Amendment: A Move Towards Simplicity In the 
Test For Immunity, 60 MO. L. REV. 953, 954 (1995).  See also Gordon L. Hamrick, IV, Comments, 
Roving Federalism: Waiver Doctrine After College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Education Expense Board, 49 EMORY L.J. 859, 860 (2000) (stating that the College Savings Bank 
decision “constructs a double standard for public and private participants in commercial enterprise, 
thus ensuring that the [College Savings Bank] decision will have a critical effect on the mix of in-
centives affecting states as they expand their entry into the arena of business for profit”).  Cf. Susan 
Schoenfeld, Comment, The Applicability of Eleventh Amendment Immunity Under the Copyright 
Acts of 1909 and 1976, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 163, 190 (1986) (“The manifest injustice of closing the 
doors of the federal courts to individuals seeking recovery against a state is starkly presented when 
an individual seeks damages for a state’s unlawful appropriation of copyrighted property.”). 
 12. Referring to a state’s immunity from patent infringement suits, the New Star Lasers court 
stated that it “can conceive of no other context in which a litigant may lawfully enjoy all the bene-
fits of a federal property or right, while rejecting its limitations.”  New Star Lasers, Inc. v. Regents 
of the Univ. of Cal., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1244 (E.D. Cal. 1999). 
 13. “Patentees now occupy a very precarious position relative to the states, and are left with 
the prospects of no uniform, viable forum for addressing state violation of their property rights.”  
Barry N. Young & Rachael A. Campbell, Florida Prepaid v. College Savings: United States Su-
preme Court Supports State Immunity From Suit Under Federal Patent Law, 16 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 499, 509 (2000). 
 14. “Every patent shall . . . grant to the patentee . . . the right to exclude others from making, 
using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States . . . .”  35 U.S.C. § 154 
(1994). 
 15. “[A] State engaging in no more than ordinary business activities enjoys a substantial edge 
over its competitors.”  New Star Lasers, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 
1243 (E.D. Cal. 1999).  Congress’ inability to require states to be amenable to suit allows states to 
infringe patents with impunity.  Kenneth S. Weitzman, Comment, Copyright and Patent Clause of 
the Constitution: Does Congress Have the Authority to Abrogate State Eleventh Amendment Sover-
eign Immunity After Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.?, 2 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 297, 330 (1991). 
 16. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994); 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1994). 
 17. A denial of monetary damages “substantially refuses the patentee relief.”  Lynn H. 
Shecter, Constitutional Law-Sovereign Immunity-Right of a Patentee to Bring Suit in Federal Court 
Against a State Agency for Patent Infringement, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 1595, 1601 (1973). 
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Patent infringement by the states and their agencies, while not an 
historically significant problem,19 may very well become a significant 
issue if the Patent and Trademark Office continues to see significant 
growth in not only the number of patent applications it receives and is-
sues each year,20 but also a continued expansion of the fields in which 
patents are issued.21  An increase in the number of states acting in pro-
prietary non-governmental roles22 coupled with states taking increased 
advantage of the federal intellectual property system23 and the increase 
in the rate of patent issuance may find patent owners holding a “right 
                                                          
 18. See infra notes 153 and 157 and accompanying text. 
 19. But see Statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, before the Subcommittee 
on Courts and Intellectual Property Committee on the Judiciary on State Sovereign Immunity and 
Protection of Intellectual Property (July 27, 2000) 2000 WL 1073148 (hereinafter, Peters Testimo-
ny) (stating that data compilation on the pervasiveness of federal intellectual property right viola-
tions by States and their agencies may be impossible to accurately determine subsequent to the 1985 
decision in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon). 
 20. Comprehensive statistics of annual patent applications received and number of patents 
issued by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) are available on the PTO’s website 
(<http://www.uspto.gov >).  These statistics indicate a sharp increase in the both the number of pa-
tent applications received and the number of patents issued.  For example, in the years 1963, 1983, 
1993 and 1999 the total number of patent applications received were: 90, 982; 112,040; 188,739; 
288,811 respectively.  U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, U.S. Patent Statistics, Calendar Years 
1963 – 1999 (visited March 27, 2001) 
<http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.pdf>.  In those same years the number of 
patents issued was: 48,971; 61,982; 109,747; 169,094.  Id. 
 21. E.g., State Street Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999), (method of doing business patents); In re Alappat, 
33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (computer programs); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) 
(living organisms).  See also Michael North, Note, The U.S. Expansion of Patentable Subject Mat-
ter: Creating a Competitive Advantage for Foreign Multinational Companies?, 18 B.U. INT’L L.J. 
111 (2000).  There may be no practical limits as to what may be patented.  See, e.g., Jeffrey A. 
Smith, Comment, It’s Your Move – No It’s Not! The Application of Patent Law to Sports Moves, 70 
U. COLO. L. REV. 1051 (1999) (discussing the patentablity of sports moves). 
 22. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.  Cf. Schoenfeld, supra note 11, at 191 (arguing 
that states should only be amenable to suit when acting in a proprietary manner, not when acting in 
a governmental capacity). 
 23. “States and their institutions, especially State universities, benefit hugely from the federal 
intellectual property laws.  All 50 States own or have obtained patents – some hold many hundreds 
of patents . . . and the trend is toward increased participation by the States in commerce involving 
intellectual property rights.”  145 CONG. REC. S13552-04, S13557 (1999) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy).  For example, in 1999, the University of California received more patents (436) than did 
Microsoft (352), DuPont (338), AT&T (278), General Motors (275), Boeing (147), Compaq (251), 
Merck (216) and Ford (151).  U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Patenting By Organization 1999 
(visited March 27, 2001) <http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/topo_99.pdf>.  “Both 
the number and percent of total patents assigned to U.S. academic institutions have steadily in-
creased since 1985. . . .”  U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Technology Assessment and Forecast 
Report, U.S. Colleges and Universities – Utility Patent Grants 1969-1999 (visited March 27, 2001) 
<http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/univ.pdf>. 
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without a remedy.”24 
Congress has made attempts, in light of recent Supreme Court cases 
affecting the state sovereign immunity doctrine, to protect the rights of 
patent owners in the event of a state infringement.25  However, the Court 
has not been receptive to those efforts.26  The Intellectual Property 
Rights Restoration Act of 1999 (IPRRA),27 a Senate Bill currently mak-
ing its way through Congress, seeks to provide a remedy for patent in-
fringement by the states that Supreme Court will find constitutional.28 
In this Comment, Part II will explore the history of state sovereign 
immunity under both the Eleventh Amendment and the common law.29  
Part III examines Senate Bill 1835, also known as the Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights Restoration Act of 1999.30  Part III looks at not only the sub-
stantive provisions of the IPRRA, but also at the legal arguments and 
policy concerns that support the Act.  Part IV looks at other possible so-
lutions available to remedy the patent infringement-state sovereign im-
munity dilemma.31  Part V concludes by stating that the Court should 
uphold the IPRRA, if it is enacted, as a valid act of Congress which pro-
vides an effective and meaningful remedy to private patentees while ad-
vancing the policies behind both patent law and the doctrine of state 
sovereign immunity. 
 
                                                          
 24. Parden v. Terminal Ry. of the Ala. State Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184, 190 (1964).  “[I]t is a 
general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or 
action at law whenever that right is invaded.”  Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 
(1803) (citation and internal quotations omitted). 
 25. In 1992, Congress enacted the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification 
Act which sought to make it unmistakably clear that the infringement remedies available in the Pa-
tent Act applied to the states.  Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, P.L. 
102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992) (enacted).  See also Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, P.L. 102-
542, 106 Stat. 3567 (1992) (enacted); Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, P.L. 101-553, 104 Stat. 
2749 (1990) (enacted). 
 26. Some have deemed the courts recent efforts as “judicial activism under the rubric of pro-
tecting State sovereignty.”  146 CONG. REC. S7758-01, S7758 (July 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy). 
 27. Intellectual Property Rights Restoration Act of 1999, S.1835, 106th Cong [hereinafter 
IPRRA]. 
 28. The Court has held that numerous stringent criteria must be met before a state’s sovereign 
immunity will be found waived, abrogated or otherwise set aside.  See infra notes 33-152 and ac-
companying text. 
 29. See infra notes 33-163 and accompanying text. 
 30. See infra notes 164-231 and accompanying text. 
 31. See infra notes 232-241 and accompanying text. 
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II.  SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND STATE AMENABILITY TO SUIT 
To properly understand the impact of sovereign immunity on patent 
infringement litigation, it is necessary to understand the background of 
the Eleventh Amendment and the recent developments in state sovereign 
immunity jurisprudence.32  Section A explores the basic principles of the 
modern sovereign immunity doctrine.33  Section B looks at exceptions to 
the sovereign immunity doctrine.34  Section C looks briefly at other pro-
tection for patent owners outside of the Patent Act.35 
A.  Sources of Sovereign Immunity 
1.  Eleventh Amendment 
In 1793, the Supreme Court decided Chisholm v. Georgia.36  The 
decision allowed Chisholm, a South Carolina citizen to sue the State of 
Georgia to recover monies the State owed him.  It was not disputed that 
the State was obligated to pay Chisholm certain monies.  The real issue 
before the Chisholm Court was whether the federal courts had jurisdic-
tion to hear a case where a citizen of one state sued the government of 
another state.37  The Chisholm Court determined that the federal courts 
did in fact have jurisdiction based upon the “letter of the Constitution”38 
                                                          
 32. This Comment will try to present a brief review of the relevant case law and statutory re-
sponses as they pertain to patent law and the jurisdictional bar of sovereign immunity.  I will barely 
be able to scratch the surface of the simmering academic and legal debates surrounding the Eleventh 
Amendment and the state sovereign immunity doctrine.  For a more in-depth analysis of Eleventh 
Amendment jurisprudence, see James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An “Explanatory” 
Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269 (1998); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sov-
ereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and 
State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889 (1983); William A. Fletch-
er, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirma-
tive Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 
(1983); Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity,  77 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 3, 18 (1963). 
 33. See infra notes 36-129 and accompanying text. 
 34. See infra notes 130-152 and accompanying text. 
 35. See infra notes 153-163 and accompanying text. 
 36. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2. Dall.) 419 (1793). 
 37. As the Court worded the issue it was “[c]an the State of Georgia, being one of the United 
States of America, be made a party-defendant in any case, in the Supreme Court of the United 
States, at the suit of a private citizen, even although he himself is, and his testator was, a citizen of 
the State of South Carolina.” 
 Id. at 420. 
 38. Id. 
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as set forth in section 2 of Article III of the Constitution.39 
The states quickly responded to Chisholm by ratifying the Eleventh 
Amendment.40  Effective in 1798, only five years after the Chisholm de-
cision, the Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of 
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or 
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
State.”41  By its express terms, the Eleventh Amendment only bars fed-
eral court jurisdiction when suits are brought against states by non-
resident citizens and citizens of foreign lands.42 
The Eleventh Amendment was initially construed narrowly.  In Co-
hens v. Virginia,43 the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment only 
prohibited unconsenting states from being sued in federal court where 
the plaintiff was a resident of another state or a foreign country.44 
This narrow construction of Cohens would not last long.  In Hans v. 
Louisiana,45 the Supreme Court held that the principle of sovereign im-
munity reflected in the Eleventh Amendment rendered states immune 
from suits for monetary damages in federal court even where federal ju-
risdiction is premised on the presence of a federal question, despite this 
scenario not being expressly included in the Eleventh Amendment.46  In 
Hans, a Louisiana citizen sued the State of Louisiana in federal court for 
                                                          
 39. “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Con-
stitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Au-
thority . . . between a State and Citizens of another State . . . .”  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
The Court held that it was “no degradation of sovereignty, in the States, to submit to the Supreme 
Judiciary of the United States.”  Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 425. 
 40. The Chisholm decision “created such a shock of surprise throughout the country that, at 
the first meeting of congress thereafter, the eleventh amendment to the constitution was almost 
unanimously proposed, and was in due course adopted by the legislatures of the states.”  Hans v. 
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890).  See also Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and 
Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 62 (1989). 
 41. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 42. See, e.g., Hans, 134 U.S. at 10. 
 43. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). 
 44. Id.  The literal text of the Eleventh Amendment only prohibits suits brought by “Citizens 
of another State or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 45. Hans, 134 U.S. at 10. 
 46. Hans, 134 U.S. at 10.  See also Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944); Prin-
cipality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934); In re State of New York, 256 U.S. 490, 
497-98 (1921); Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U.S. 311 (1920); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 447-49 
(1900); Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516 (1899).  Years later, the Parden Court would state that “a 
suit on state debt obligations without the State’s consent was precisely the ‘evil’ against which both 
the Eleventh Amendment and the expanded immunity doctrine of the Hans case were directed.”  
Parden v. Terminal Ry. of the Ala. State Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184, 187 (1964).  See also Jaffe, 
supra note 32, at 19. 
7
White: Protecting Patent Owners from Infringement by the States
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2002
WHITE1.DOC 1/22/2021  3:45 PM 
538 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35: 3/4 
payment on bonds that the State had repudiated.47  As a basis for federal 
jurisdiction, Hans, the Louisiana citizen, alleged the actions of the State 
violated the Contracts Clause48 of the United States Constitution.49  The 
Hans Court ruled in favor of the State on the basis of sovereign immuni-
ty under the Eleventh Amendment, thereby preventing a citizen from su-
ing his own state in federal court.50  After the liberal51 interpretation of 
the Eleventh Amendment in Hans, states enjoyed absolute immunity 
from all unconsented suits in federal court, whether brought by resident 
or non-resident citizens.52 
Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama State Docks Department53 
was the first case54 claiming Eleventh Amendment immunity where the 
cause of action was brought under a federal statute.55  The Parden Court 
held that the State of Alabama, by operating a state-owned railway, had 
constructively waived56 its sovereign immunity in federal court and 
could therefore be sued in a federal court under a federal statue for mon-
etary damages.57  The Court’s bipartite analysis asked whether (1) Con-
gress intended to subject states to suit when it enacted the statute, and (2) 
whether Congress had the power to subject the states to suit in light of 
                                                          
 47. Hans, 134 U.S. at 1 . 
 48. “No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .”  U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 49. Hans, 134 U.S. at 3. 
 50. Id. at 18-21. 
 51. The Eleventh Amendment doctrine of sovereign immunity should be liberally construed.  
Standing Rock Sioux Indian Tribe v. Dorgan, 505 F.2d 1135, 1138 (8th Cir. 1974).  But see Parker 
v. Mandel, 344 F. Supp. 1068, 1072 (D. Md. 1972) (stating that Eleventh Amendment should be 
construed narrowly). 
 52. See Susan D. Raively, Note, Copyright Infringement Suits Against States: Is the Eleventh 
Amendment a Valid Defense?, 6 CARDOZO ARTS AND ENT. L.J. 501, 514 (1988). 
 53. Parden v. Terminal Ry. of the Ala. State Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184 (1964). 
 54. The Court noted that this case was distinctly unlike Hans where federal question jurisdic-
tion was being invoked.  Id. at 186.  The Court stated that “[h]ere for the first time in this Court, a 
State’s claim of immunity against suit by an individual meets a suit brought upon a cause of action 
expressly created by Congress.”  Id. at 187. 
 55. Petitioners in Parden where citizens of the State of Alabama who sued the State under the 
Federal Employers’ Liability Act for personal injuries sustained while the petitioners where em-
ployed by the state-owned railway.  Id. at 184-85.  The statute permitted suit against “common car-
rier[s] by railroad . . . engaging in commerce between the several States.”  Petitioners contended the 
state-owned railway fell within the statutory definition and was therefore subject to suit in federal 
court.  The State appeared specially and moved to dismiss based on its sovereign immunity.  Id. at 
185.  The District Court dismissed the suit, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, 311 F.2d 727.  The Su-
preme Court reversed.  Parden, 377 U.S. at 185. 
 56. Sovereign immunity may be waived.  Id. at 186.  A State’s freedom from nonconsensual 
suit will not protect it from suit to which it has consented.  Id. at 186.  See infra notes 130-137 and 
accompanying text. 
 57. Parden, 377 U.S. at 186. 
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the state’s sovereign immunity.58 
The Court made short work of the first question by citing prece-
dent59 supporting the proposition that Congress meant the specific stat-
ute to apply to both private and state-owned railways.60  The Court was 
not willing to create a “right without a remedy”61 by exempting state-
owned railways from the plain meaning of the statute under the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity as Congress could not have intended such a 
“pointless and frustrating . . . result.”62 
With respect to the second element, the Court found the Commerce 
Clause63 vested sufficient authority in Congress to regulate railroads op-
erating in interstate commerce.64  By reasoning that, although the inher-
ent nature of sovereignty has rooted within it immunity from suit,65 the 
states surrendered a portion of their sovereignty when they granted to 
Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce.66  To hold other-
wise would have been an overtly paradoxical result, as it would allow a 
state to avoid liability from federal regulation merely by engaging in the 
regulated conduct.67 
However, the Parden Court made it clear that it did not intend to 
overturn the Eleventh Amendment or the rule of Hans,68 but rather stat-
ed it was the Court’s intention to find an implied or constructive waiver 
in situations like that presented in Parden.69  Constructive waiver was 
found in Parden because Congress intended to make states amenable to 
                                                          
 58. Id. at 187. 
 59. In particular, the Court cited United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936), which held 
the federal Safety Appliance Act applicable to state-owned railways, and California v. Taylor, 353 
U.S. 553 (1957), which applied the Railway Labor Act to a state-owned railway.  United States v. 
California did not present Eleventh Amendment issues as the suit was brought not by an individual, 
but by the United States.  Parden, 377 U.S. at 188 n.6.  California v. Taylor did not directly present 
Eleventh Amendment issues, as it was a suit against a federal board.  Id. at 188 n.7. 
 60. Parden, 377 U.S. at 187-88. 
 61. Id. at 190. 
 62. Id. 
 63. “The Congress shall have the Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, 
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”  U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 64. Parden, 377 U.S. at 190-192. 
 65. Id. at 190-91.  See also Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 51 (1944); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton).  Cf. Jaffe, supra note 32, at 3, 18 (tracing the history of 
sovereign immunity through English and American history). 
 66. Parden, 377 U.S. at 191. 
 67. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 582 (1946) (“[B]y engaging in the railroad 
business a State cannot withdraw the railroad from the power of the federal government to regulate 
commerce.”) 
 68. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).  See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text. 
 69. Parden, 377 U.S. at 192.  The Court stated that “[i]t remains the law that a State may not 
be sued by an individual without its consent.”  Id. 
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suit by enacting the statute in question pursuant to a legitimate exercise 
of its Commerce Clause powers70 and by engaging in the regulated con-
duct some twenty years after the federal statute was enacted, no other 
view can be held but that the State impliedly consented to suit.71  The 
rule of Parden set forth a constructive waiver exception to Eleventh 
Amendment sovereign immunity.  However, after more recent cases de-
veloped, the constructive waiver doctrine is no longer good law.72  States 
will no longer be deemed to have constructively waived their immunity 
by their conduct. 
Edelman v. Jordan73 used the Eleventh Amendment to slam the 
door on monetary judgments against states that will inevitably be paid 
out of the state treasury.74  Edelman recognized a private party’s right to 
seek prospective relief under the doctrine of Ex parte Young,75 but de-
clined to extend that doctrine to allow recovery of accrued, retroactive 
payments.76 
Following the trend of prior cases which allowed state sovereign 
immunity ample room to grow, Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon77 
significantly altered the constitutional landscape of Eleventh Amend-
ment analysis by making it still more difficult for Congress to make 
states amenable to suit in federal courts.  In Atascadero, Scanlon, an ap-
plicant for a position as a graduate assistant with a state hospital, alleged 
                                                          
 70. Id. 
 71. Id.  The State, by venturing into the congressional realm “assume[d] the conditions that 
Congress under the Constitution attached.”  Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm’n, 359 U.S. 
275, 281-82 (1959).  “[W]hen a State leaves the sphere that is exclusively its own and enters into 
activities subject to congressional regulation, it subjects itself to that regulation as fully as if it were 
a private person or corporation.”  Parden, 377 U.S. at 196.  Cf.  South Carolina v. United States, 
199 U.S. 437, 463 (1905); New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946). 
 72. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 
683 (1999). 
 73. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
 74. Id. at 663, 665.  “[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be 
paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”  Id. at 663. 
 75. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).  For a discussion of the Ex parte Young doctrine 
see infra notes 158-163 and accompanying text. 
 76. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 669.  To demonstrate how far the Edelman doctrine would extend, 
the Edelman Court impliedly affirmed its holding in Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 
323 U.S. 459 (1945).  See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668-69.  In Ford Motor, a taxpayer who paid taxes 
under protest sought a refund of those taxes from the state officials responsible for their collection.  
Ford Motor, 459 U.S. at 459-461.  The taxpayer alleged the taxes collected violated the U.S. Con-
stitution.  Id.  The Ford Motor Court held the taxpayer’s action to be one against the State seeking a 
monetary judgment and barred by the Eleventh Amendment.  Despite the fact that the taxpayer was 
merely seeking to recover only the monies he had paid to the state as a result of an unconstitutional 
tax exaction and not any additional damages, the Court still refused to accept jurisdiction of the mat-
ter.  Id. 
 77. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985). 
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that the state hospital denied him employment because of his affliction 
with diabetes mellitus in violation of a federal statute.78  Scanlon sought 
compensatory, injunctive, and declaratory relief under the federal stat-
ute.79  The State of California moved to dismiss the action on the basis 
of its Eleventh Amendment immunity.  The court of appeals held that 
Eleventh Amendment immunity did not bar the cause of action by find-
ing an implied waiver based on participation in a federal program.80  The 
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals decision.81 
The Supreme Court began its analysis by recognizing the expansive 
view of the Eleventh Amendment first set forth in Hans.82  The Court 
went on to acknowledge the waiver83 and the Fourteenth Amendment 
enforcement provision exceptions84 to the Eleventh Amendment.85  
However, as the “Eleventh Amendment implicates the fundamental con-
stitutional balance between the Federal Government and the States” 
these exceptions are tempered by limiting their application to narrowly 
tailored circumstances.86  The Court was unable to find a waiver based 
on a California Constitution provision, as the provision did not specifi-
cally state the State’s willingness to be subject to suit in federal court.87 
However, the waiver analysis was not what would make Atas-
cadero an important case in modern Eleventh Amendment jurispru-
dence.  It was the holding that “Congress may abrogate the States’ con-
stitutionally secured sovereign immunity from suit in federal court only 
by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the stat-
                                                          
 78. Id. at 236.  The federal statute in question was the Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794.  Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hosp., 735 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 81. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 234. 
 82. Id. at 237-38.  The Court stated that the “significance of [the Eleventh] Amendment ‘lies 
in its affirmation that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial 
authority in Art. III’ of the Constitution.”  Id. at 238 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984)). 
 83. See infra notes 130-137 and accompanying text. 
 84. See infra notes 138-146 and accompanying text. 
 85. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238. 
 86. Id. at 238-240.  “[A] State will be deemed to have waived its immunity ‘only where stated 
by the most express language or by such overwhelming implication from the text as [will] leave no 
room for any other reasonable construction.’  Likewise, in determining whether Congress in exercis-
ing its Fourteenth Amendment powers has abrogated the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity, 
we have required an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to overturn the constitutionally 
guaranteed immunity of the several States.”  Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 87. The California Constitutional provision provided that “[s]uits may be brought against the 
State in such manner and in such courts as shall be direct by law.”  CAL. CONST., art. III, § 5.  As 
the provision did not explicitly state that California waived its immunity and was willing to be sub-
ject to suit in federal courts, no waiver was found.  Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 241. 
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ute” that rendered Atascadero important.88  Broad statutory language 
will not be enough to find the requisite unmistakable intent to abro-
gate.89  To abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity, Congress must specif-
ically subject states to federal jurisdiction.90  Therefore, the federal stat-
ute in question in Atascadero, by providing that “any recipient of 
Federal assistance” is liable for violations under the statute, did not evi-
dence the requisite unmistakable intent to abrogate California’s sover-
eign immunity.91 
Prior to the Atascadero decision, owners of federal intellectual 
property rights could fully protect their rights against infringement by 
the states.92  It appeared to be the rule post-Atascadero that Congress 
could abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity provided that there was an 
unmistakable intent to abrogate.  However, Chew v. California93 and Ja-
                                                          
 88. Id. at 242. 
 89. Id. at 246. 
 90. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 246.  See also Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99. 
 91. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 246. 
 92. Atascadero allowed states to avoid infringement and validity claims in federal courts.  
Blaney Harper, Intellectual Property and State Sovereign Immunity: The Eleventh Amendment Un-
der Scrutiny, 9 NO. 7 COMPUTER LAWYER 21, 26 (1992). 
States had long enjoyed the benefits of the intellectual property laws on equal footing 
with private parties.  By the same token, and in accordance with the fundamental princi-
ples of equity on which our intellectual property laws are founded, the States bore the 
burdens of the intellectual property laws, being liable for infringements just like private 
parties.  States were free to join intellectual property markets as participants, or to hold 
back from commerce and limit themselves to a narrower governmental role.  The intel-
lectual property right of exclusion meant what it said and was enforced evenhandedly for 
public and private entities alike.  This harmonious state of affairs ended in 1985, [with 
the Atascadero decision]. 
145 CONG. REC. S13552-04, S13556 (Oct. 29, 1999) (statement of Sen. Leahy).  Peters Testimony, 
supra note 19 (stating that from 1790 to 1962, no court decision exempted states from liability un-
der the Copyright Act). 
 93. Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990).  In Chew, Marian Chew, a resident of 
Ohio, brought suit against the State of California for the State’s alleged infringement of Chew’s 
patent for testing automobile exhaust emissions.  Id. at 332.  The federal District Court dismissed 
the suit when the State claimed immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.  Id.  Chew opposed the 
State’s motion at the district court, arguing (1) that the state had waived its immunity under state 
statues and the state constitution, (2) that the State impliedly consented by participation in the feder-
al Clean Air Act, and (3) that Congress had abrogated the State’s immunity in various provisions of 
the Patent Act and by giving the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over patent infringement suits.  
Id.  The District Court rejected all of Chew’s claims, the first two under Atascadero State Hospital 
v. Scanlon.  Id.  Only the abrogation theory was advanced on appeal.  Id.  The Federal Circuit up-
held the dismissal, finding that, assuming Congress had the power to subject states to suit for patent 
infringement, “as a matter of statutory interpretation, that Congress has evidenced no intent to exer-
cise such power in the patent statute” under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1982).  Id. at 334.  The Federal Cir-
cuit found that the word “whoever” in the § 271(a) was not unmistakably clear evidence of Con-
gressional intent to abrogate.  Id.  The Court also rejected an argument advanced by Chew that the 
public policy in awarding patents and the exclusiveness of federal jurisdiction in patent infringe-
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cobs Wind Electric Company v. Florida Department of Transportation,94 
both decided by the Federal Circuit in 1990, upheld the States’ sovereign 
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for patent infringement suits 
in federal court.95 
In response to the Jacobs Wind and Chew decisions, Congress 
passed the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act 
(PRCA)96 in 1992.  The PRCA made clear that Congress intended the 
patent infringement provisions of the Patent Act to apply to the states.97  
Congress provided several justifications for the PRCA: (1) immunity 
cuts against Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, which 
grants Congress the power to issue patents for limited period to promote 
the progress of science; (2) the amendment prevents states from freely 
infringing thereby discouraging future innovation; (3) enabling patentees 
to sue states in federal court prevents states from enjoying advantages 
not available to private parties; (4) the federal government already con-
sents to patent infringement suits; and (5) the original patent code con-
tains no expression of congressional intent to exclude states from the 
reach of the statutes.98  To justify the legislation, Congress cited as its 
authority to pass the PRCA the Interstate Commerce Clause, the Patent 
                                                          
ment actions support a more liberal abrogation test.  Id. at 335. 
 94. Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Florida Dept. of Transp., 919 F.2d 726 (Fed. Cir. 1990).  Jacobs 
Wind involved a Florida corporation suing the Florida Department of Transportation for patent in-
fringement.  Id. at 727.  Florida Department of Transportation moved to dismiss claiming Eleventh 
Amendment immunity and cited Chew as precedent.  Id.  However, Jacobs attempted to distinguish 
Chew as Chew involved a diversity of citizenship suit, while no such diversity was present in Ja-
cobs.  The court found this distinction unimportant and affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of Ja-
cobs’ suit.  Id. at 728-29. 
 95. Chew, 893 F.2d at 331; Jacobs Wind, 919 F.2d at 726.  See also Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Alza 
Corp., 804 F. Supp. 614, 625-26 (D.N.J. 1992); (finding no congressional abrogation of sovereign 
immunity nor a waiver of immunity by the state); Kersavage v. University of Tenn., 731 F. Supp. 
1327, 1330 (E.D. Tenn. 1989) (holding state university immune from suit under federal patent stat-
utes).  Cf. Lane v. First Nat’l Bank, 871 F.2d 166, 167-74 (1st Cir. 1989); Richard Anderson Pho-
tography v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114, 117-22 (4th Cir. 1988) (both Lane and Richard Anderson Pho-
tography held that language of Copyright Act did not unequivocally abrogate a state’s Eleventh 
Amendment sovereign immunity as required by Atascadero). 
 96. Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, P.L. 102-206, 104 Stat. 
4230 (1992) (enacted). 
 97. By amending the 35 U.S.C. § 271 to include language reading “[a]s used in this section, 
the term ‘whoever’ includes any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee 
of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his official capacity” and by adding 35 U.S.C. § 296 
which expressly state that sovereign immunity under any theory would not bar any infringement 
action and that all remedies available in the Patent Act were available against States, Congress 
clearly satisfied the Atascadero criteria for abrogating a state’s immunity.  Patent and Plant Variety 
Protection Remedy Clarification Act, P.L. 102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992) (enacted). 
 98. S. REP. NO. 102-280  (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3568 (hereinafter S. REP 
NO. 102-280). 
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and Copyright Clause, and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.99 
However, in 1996, the Supreme Court’s Seminole Tribe decision 
would render the PRCA invalid, at least under the Commerce Clause and 
the Patent Clause.100  In Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court held that 
Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity under its Article I 
powers.  The abrogation analysis of sovereign immunity under Seminole 
Tribe is (1) whether Congress has “unequivocally expressed its intent to 
abrogate the immunity” and (2) whether Congress acted “pursuant to a 
valid exercise of power.”101 
The Seminole Tribe analysis began rather easily.  The language of 
the statute in question, which was enacted after Atascadero, contained 
unequivocal language expressing the intent to abrogate a State’s sover-
eign immunity.102 
The second part of the Seminole Tribe analysis sharply divided the 
5-to-4 Court, and continues to do so to this day.103  The majority began 
by noting that the Court’s precedents have found the authority to abro-
gate under only two provisions of the Constitution.104  The first of these 
provisions is the Section 5 enforcement provision of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which extends authority for Congress to enact “appropriate 
legislation” to enforce the prohibitions directed at the states in section 1 
of that Amendment.105  The second abrogating provision is Article I’s 
Commerce Clause.106  The Seminole Tribe Court reexamined the five-
                                                          
 99. S. REP NO. 102-280. 
 100. Seminole Tribe held that only the Fourteenth Amendment could be used to abrogate a 
state’s sovereign immunity and that no Article I powers could abrogate a state’s sovereign immuni-
ty.  Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55-60 (1996). 
 101. Id. at 55. 
 102. Id. at 56-57. 
 103. Hayden Gregory, Washington Legislative Report, 18 No. 3 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW NEWSLETTER 30, 30 (2000). 
 104. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59. 
 105. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV.  See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976).  Section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment receives this exalted status capable of overriding the Eleventh 
Amendment because it fundamentally altered the balance of state and federal power by expanding 
federal power at the expense of the states.  Id. at 455. 
 106. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59.  Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. held that the Commerce 
Clause could abrogate the Eleventh Amendment.  Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 
(1989).  Union Gas involved a lawsuit under federal environmental laws brought by the United 
States against a former mine owner who then impleaded the State of Pennsylvania.  The Union Gas 
Court held that the federal statutes rendered the State subject to suit in federal court.  In reaching 
their decision, the Court stated that Supreme Court decisions “mark a trail unmistakably leading to 
the conclusion that congress may permit suits against the States for money damages.”  Id. at 14.  
The Court stated that “the power to regulate commerce includes the power to override States’ im-
munity from suit, but [the Court] will not conclude that Congress has overridden this immunity un-
less it does so clearly.”  Id. at 14-15.  The power to regulate commerce would be “incomplete with-
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year old Union Gas decision which found abrogation possible under the 
Commerce Clause and found that it “depart[ed] from [the] established 
understanding of the Eleventh Amendment and undermine[d] the ac-
cepted function of Article III . . . [and] was wrongly decided.”107  The 
Court’s holding left Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as the only 
clause capable of abrogating a state’s sovereign immunity.108  Subse-
quent to Seminole Tribe, the status of the PRCA was questionable. 
In 1999, the Supreme Court decide a pair of cases where a state’s 
sovereign immunity and a patentee’s rights were in direct conflict.109  
Florida Prepaid110 involved a patentee bringing suit against the State of 
Florida for infringement of the patentee’s patent.111  When suit was filed, 
the PRCA had already been enacted.112  However, after Seminole Tribe, 
the PRCA was only a valid congressional act if made pursuant to the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Following a Seminole Tribe analysis,113 the 
Court found the requisite intent to abrogate, but could not find the au-
thority to abrogate under the Fourteenth Amendment.114  To be a valid 
abrogation under the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress must identify 
conduct transgressing the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and must narrowly tailor the legislation to remedying and 
preventing such transgressing conduct as City of Boerne v. Flores115set 
forth.116  As Congress did not identify a pattern of patent infringement 
by the states, the PRCA cannot be validly enacted pursuant to the Four-
teenth Amendment117 
After the Florida Prepaid decision, the only remedy available to a 
patent owner for an infringement of his patent by a state entity was pro-
                                                          
out the authority to render States liable in damages.”  Id. at 20.  Seminole Tribe overruled Union 
Gas.  Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66. 
 107. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66. 
 108. Id. at 65. 
 109. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 
(1999); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 
(1999). 
 110. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 
(1999). 
 111. In Florida Prepaid, College Savings Bank held a patent in a certain type of financing 
methodology used to pay for college tuition.  Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 630-31.  The State of 
Florida created an entity which used College Savings Bank’s patented methodology to finance col-
lege educations.  Id. at 631. 
 112. Id. at 631. 
 113. See supra notes 100-108 and accompanying text. 
 114. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 635-41. 
 115. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 116. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 639.  See also City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 507. 
 117. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640-43. 
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spective relief under the doctrine of Ex parte Young118 or pursuit of a 
state remedy.  To make matters worse, the Supreme Court, on the same 
day as it handed down the Florida Prepaid decision, extended sovereign 
immunity to states engaged in purely commercial activities.119 
The current situation is bleak for patent and other intellectual prop-
erty rights owners.120  As it stands, patent owners “have but one arrow 
left in their quiver to prevent or deter infringement of their intellectual 
property rights by States,”121 that being injunctive relief against particu-
lar employees of the state.  While sovereign immunity has been drasti-
cally strengthened, injunctive relief under the doctrine of Ex parte 
Young122 remains intact.123 
2.  The Inherent Nature of the States as Sovereigns 
The Court’s decisions “make clear that much of [the] state immuni-
ty doctrine has absolutely nothing to do with the limit on judicial power 
contained in the Eleventh Amendment.”124  According to many scholars, 
the presence of the Eleventh Amendment in the United States Constitu-
tion may be redundant; states may have had sovereign immunity all 
along125 and may continue to have immunity greater than that set forth in 
the Eleventh Amendment.126  The Constitution, the founding document 
                                                          
 118. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
 119. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 
(1999). 
 120. After Florida Prepaid, “[p]atentees now occupy a very precarious position relative to the 
states, and are left with the prospects of no uniform, viable forum for addressing state violation of 
their property rights.”  Young, supra note 13, at 509. 
 121. See Peters Testimony, supra note 19. 
 122. See infra notes 158-163 and accompanying text. 
 123. However, some feel, given the Court’s movement in recent years, that the doctrine of Ex 
parte Young may be subject to question.  See Peters Testimony, supra note 19. 
 124. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 25 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 125. See 17 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 123.02 (3d. Release 
126, 2000) (stating that before the formation of the United States, each state was a sovereign entity 
and enjoyed the benefit of the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity). 
 126. “[T]he sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from nor is limited by the terms 
of the Eleventh Amendment.”  Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999).  “[T]he Constitution’s 
structure, and its history, and the authoritative interpretations by this Court make clear [that] the 
States’ immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed be-
fore the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today . . . .”  Id.  “[I]t is inherent in 
the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without [the state’s] con-
sent.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 81.  “Eleventh Amendment discourse is less concerned with analyzing 
the plain meaning of the Amendment’s text as it is with locating backdrop sovereign immunity con-
cepts believed by the Court to be central to the federalism rubric.”  Hamrick, supra note 11, at 864.  
But see Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity “Exception,” 110 HARV. L. REV. 102, 123 
(1996) (questioning why, in a democratic republic the presumption is not against sovereign immuni-
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of the United States, “recognizes the States as sovereign entities.”127  
Under the inherent power view of state sovereign immunity, the Elev-
enth Amendment was an explanatory amendment128 designed to remedy 
the Chisholm decision, not to create sovereign immunity in the first in-
stance.129 
B.  Exceptions to Sovereign Immunity 
1.  Waiver 
Waiver constitutes a well-known exception to the doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity sufficient to subject a state to suit in federal court.130  
However, as with all waivers of constitutional rights, a waiver of sover-
eign immunity will not be lightly inferred.131  States may waive their 
immunity by making a general appearance in litigation before a federal 
                                                          
ty as accountability to the people, both at the polls and to wronged individuals in the courts, should 
be the inherent nature of sovereignty); John Randolph Prince, Forgetting the Lyrics and Changing 
the Tune: The Eleventh Amendment and Textual Infidelity, 104 DICK. L. REV. 1 (1999) (arguing for 
an interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment that follows the clear textual language of the Amend-
ment). 
 127. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 n.15 (1996).  Cf. Blatchforce v. Native Village 
of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (“[T]he States entered the federal system with their sovereign-
ty intact.”).  But see Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 259 (1985) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (“There simply is no constitutional principle of state sovereign immunity, and no constitu-
tionally mandated policy of excluding suits against States from federal court.”). 
 128. See Pfander, supra note 32, at 1269. 
 129. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (the Eleventh Amendment stands 
not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition which it confirms).  But see Atascadero, 473 
U.S. at 259 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The flawed underpinning [of the Court’s Eleventh Amend-
ment jurisprudence] is the premise that either the Constitution or the Eleventh Amendment embod-
ied a principle of state sovereign immunity as a limit on the federal judicial power.”)  Justice Bren-
nan also cites new evidence showing that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to 
constitutionalize the doctrine of state sovereign immunity.  Id. 
 130. “[T]he [Supreme] Court consistently has held that a State may consent to suit against it in 
federal court.”  Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99.  See also Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 414 (1979); Petty 
v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission, 359 U.S. 275, 276 (1959); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 
18, 24 (1933); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883); Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. 527, 529 
(1857).  For a more in-depth analysis of the waiver doctrine, see Hamrick, supra note 11. 
 131. “Constructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the surrender of consti-
tutional rights. . . .”  Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974).  The Court will find a waiver 
“only where stated ‘by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the 
text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.’”  Id. at 673 (quoting Murray v. 
Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909)).  See also Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 241 (stating that 
the test for finding a waiver of immunity is a “stringent one”).  “[C]ourts indulge every reasonable 
presumption against waiver” of constitutional rights.  Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy ex rel. Bogash, 301 
U.S. 389, 393 (1937). 
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court,132 by statute133 or by state constitution.134  A waiver of immunity 
before a state’s own courts will be insufficient to constitute a waiver of 
immunity before federal courts.135  A state will be deemed to have 
waived immunity “only where stated ‘by the most express language or 
by such overwhelming implication from the text as [will] leave no room 
for any other reasonable construction.’”136  Courts will no longer find a 
state to have constructively waived its sovereign immunity by its con-
duct.137 
2.  Congressional Abrogation 
a.  Pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
As a patent constitutes property, a suit for patent infringement im-
plicates interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.138  Fitzpatrick 
v. Bitzer,139among others, stated that the Eleventh Amendment, and the 
                                                          
 132. Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1883). 
 133. Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 468-70 (1945).  When waiver 
of Eleventh Amendment sovereignty is by state statute, the question the courts must answer is 
whether the state intended to waive its sovereign immunity.  Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge 
Commission, 359 U.S. 275, 278-79 (1959).  Compacts between states may also provide a basis to 
find a waiver of sovereign immunity.  Id. 
 134. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 241.  “[I]n order for a state statute or constitutional provision to 
constitute a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, it must specify the State’s intention to sub-
ject itself to suit in federal court.”  Id. 
 135. Chandler v. Dix, 194 U.S. 590, 591-92 (1904).  Mere receipt of federal funds will also be 
inadequate to establish that a state has consented to suit.  Florida Dep’t of Health and Rehabilitative 
Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass’n., 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981). 
 136. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 
213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909)). 
 137. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 
681-82 (1999). 
 138. New Star Lasers, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 63 F. Supp.2d 1240, 1243 (E.D. 
Cal. 1999). 
 139. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).  Fitzpatrick involved former Connecticut State 
employees suing several state officials in their official capacities for gender discrimination in the 
administration of retirement benefit plans.  Justice Rehnquist’s opinion stated that Title VII was 
appropriate legislation under the enforcement provision of the Fourteenth Amendment and any 
claim of sovereign immunity was thereby ineffective.  Justice Brennan noted that the Eleventh 
Amendment was inapplicable here as the suit involved citizens of a State suing their own state and 
therefore it fell outside of the bounds of the Eleventh Amendment.  Id. at 457 (Brennan J., concur-
ring in judgment).  Brennan noted that any claim of sovereign immunity in the present case must 
fall under the “nonconstitutional but ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity.”  Id.  Brennan con-
curred with the majority because he felt that by surrendering certain powers to the federal govern-
ment under the commerce clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, no immunity in fact 
exists for the State to assert.  Id. at 458.  Justice Stevens, in a separate concurring opinion, felt that 
the case should be decided not on Section 5 grounds, but based on the proposition that the Eleventh 
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principle of sovereign immunity which it embodies, is necessarily lim-
ited by the enforcement provisions of Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.140  The Court felt that “Congress may in determining what 
is ‘appropriate legislation’ for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States or 
state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other con-
texts.”141  Abrogation under Section 5 was recently upheld in Seminole 
Tribe.142  Florida Prepaid143 set forth three criteria for abrogation under 
the Fourteenth Amendment: (1) Congress must establish a strong record 
of infringement by the States,144 (2) the abrogation must be drafted in 
such a way as to apply only to those states that do not provide a state 
remedy, i.e., it must be narrowly tailored145 and (3) the abrogation must 
extend only to non-negligent infringement by the states.146 
b.  Pursuant to the Commerce Clause 
Union Gas147  held that Congress could abrogate a state’s sovereign 
immunity by acting pursuant to the Commerce Clause.  It is now the law 
that Congress does not have abrogation power under the Commerce 
Clause or any other Article I power148 even when the Constitution grants 
Congress complete lawmaking authority over that area of law,149 leaving 
the enforcement provision of the Fourteenth Amendment as the only val-
id Congressional power capable of abrogating a state’s sovereign im-
munity. 
3.  Other Exceptions 
The Eleventh Amendment does not preclude states from suing other 
states,150 and the federal government is not precluded from bringing ac-
                                                          
Amendment does not bar an action against state officers enforcing an invalid statute.  Id. at 459 
(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). 
 140. Id. at 456. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55-56 (1996). 
 143. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 
(1999). 
 144. Id. at 638-39. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 645-46. 
 147. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
 148. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
 149. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
 150. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999). 
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tions against the states.151  Nor will the Eleventh Amendment prevent 
federal courts from hearing appeals of federal questions properly com-
menced before state courts when the state is a defendant.152 
C.  Other Patentee Protections 
1.  State Law and the State Court System 
While federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over matters of pa-
tent infringement,153 most states have some other types of protections for 
intellectual property rights independent of the Patent Act.154  Unfortu-
nately, these state law remedies fail to provide any remedy for an in-
fringed patent.155  However, a private patentee may be able to assert a 
takings claim in state court.156  Of course, it remains a federal legislative 
option to amend the current Patent Act to allow patent infringement cas-
es in state courts.157 
                                                          
 151. Id. 
 152. See, e.g., McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 
26-27 (1990). 
 153. “[T]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any 
Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and trademarks.  Such juris-
diction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent, plant variety, and copyright cases.”  28 
U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994).  However, state courts can decide patent issues that are properly before it.  
See, e.g., Intermedics Infusaid v. University of Minn., 804 F.2d 129 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Oxi-
metric, Inc., 748 F.2d 637 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Becher v. Contoure Labs. Inc., 279 U.S. 388 (1929). 
 154. For more on state unfair competition laws and patent enforcement, see Peter J. Wied, Pa-
tently Unfair: State Unfair Competition Laws and Patent Enforcement, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469 
(1999) and Bruce P. Keller, Condemned to Repeat the Past: The Reemergence of Misappropriation 
and Other Common Law Theories of Protection for Intellectual Property, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
401 (1998). 
 155. “As federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising under . . . federal laws, 
the majority’s conclusion that the Eleventh Amendment shields States from being sued under them 
in federal court suggests that persons harmed by state violations of federal copyright, bankruptcy, 
and antitrust laws have no remedy.”  Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 77 n.1 (1996) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). 
 156. Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Florida Dept. of Transp., 919 F.2d 726, 728-29 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 157. According to the Supreme Court’s Alden decision, immunity in state court is equivalent to 
immunity in federal court.  Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).  Therefore, this remedy would 
only be effective to the extent States would willingly waive their immunity before the State courts 
for actions under the federal patent Act.  Peters Testimony, supra note 19.  It would appear unlikely, 
particularly in light of the strength of the State’s sovereign immunity before the federal courts, that 
States would expose themselves to additional liability before the State courts.  Id.  However, state 
court patent jurisdiction creates new problems.  The need for uniform patent law led to the creation 
of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  Id.  Allowing patent claims to be heard before state 
courts would greatly increase the number of interpretations of patent law, thereby defeating the pur-
pose of the federal Circuit.  See id. (discussing similar problems should Congress allow copyright 
claims under Title 28 to be heard in state court).  Furthermore, state court judges have no experience 
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2.  Injunctive Relief 
As a general rule, the jurisdiction bar of the Eleventh Amendment 
prohibits suits against unconsenting states regardless whether the relief 
sought is legal or equitable in nature.158  However, under the doctrine of 
Ex parte Young,159 the Court created a narrow exception to the general 
rule.  Under Ex parte Young, federal courts may enjoin state officials 
from committing continuing or future violations of federal law,160 but 
the courts may not award retroactive or monetary damages.161  Ex parte 
Young essentially states that when a state official acts in violation of fed-
eral law, that employee is, by definition, acting outside of the scope of 
his official duties, as a state cannot authorize one of its employees to 
violate federal law.162  Therefore, a state employee is not immune and 
may be enjoined.163  However, Ex parte Young relief is limited, as it 
does not allow for the recovery of damages for past infringement. 
III.  THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS RESTORATION ACT OF 1999 
After the apparently failed Congressional attempts to provide a 
remedy to patent owners for patent infringement by the states, on No-
vember 1, 1999, Senator Leahy introduced a bill known as the Intellec-
tual Property Rights Restoration Act of 1999 (IPRRA).164 
The basic premise of the IPRRA is quite simple: any state wishing 
to own federal intellectual property, including patents,165 must expressly 
                                                          
with the issues surrounding patent law.  See id. (stating similar experience problems under the Cop-
yright Act).  See also Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobile Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 483-84 (1981) (stating 
the policies behind exclusive federal jurisdiction). 
 158. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100-01 (1984). 
 159. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).  The theory of Ex parte Young is that an unconsti-
tional act is void and therefore does not “impart to [the state officer] any immunity from responsi-
bility to the supreme authority of the United States.”  Id. at 160.  As a state does not have the au-
thority to authorize unconstitutional acts, state officers are “stripped of [their] official or 
representative character and [are] subject[ ] to the consequences of [their] official conduct.”  Id. 
 160. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).  See also Waste Mgmt. of Penn., Inc. v. Shinn, 938 
F. Supp. 1243 (D.N.J. 1996).  But see Fiedler v. New York, 925 F. Supp. 136 (N.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 161. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 666-67 (1974). 
 162. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).  See also Lemelson v. Ampex Corp., 372 F. Supp. 
708, 711 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (“Government units have no authority to violate the patent laws, and when 
they do so, they act outside the scope of their authority.”). 
 163. Many consider the doctrine of Ex parte Young to be a “legal fiction” and a “massive, 
judge-made exception” to the Eleventh Amendment.  E.g., Monaghan, supra note 126, at 127; Ann 
Althouse, When to Believe a Legal Fiction: Federal Interests and the Eleventh Amendment, 40 
HASTINGS L.J. 1123, 1123 (1989).  Others, however, consider the Eleventh Amendment an excep-
tion to Ex parte Young.  See Monaghan, supra note 126, at 126, n.173. 
 164. IPRRA. 
 165. The IPRRA applies to patents, protected plant varieties, copyrights, mask works, original 
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waive its sovereign immunity and consent to suit as a condition of being 
eligible to receive additional federal intellectual property.166  The IPRRA 
requires that, in a state’s application for federal intellectual property, the 
state provide an assurance that it will waive its Eleventh Amendment 
immunity in any subsequent actions arising under federal intellectual 
property law.167  To ensure that a state does not retract its assurance after 
being granted intellectual  property rights, the IPRRA provides conse-
quences to states that acquire federal intellectual property rights by 
providing an assurance of waiver and breach that assurance by claiming 
sovereign immunity when the state is sued.168  By forcing the state to 
take action, the IPRRA avoids the pitfalls previously encountered in at-
tempts to hold states liable for patent infringement.169  The IPRRA solu-
tion is “clear and salable, with a compelling proportionality and nexus 
between the problem and the remedy”170 and should be enacted and up-
held. 
The theory of the IPRRA has met with some judicial approval, at 
least in dicta, in prior cases.171  The law as it currently exists seems to 
                                                          
designs, trademarks, and service marks.  IPRRA § 101(1). 
 166. Section 111(a) prohibits any state from acquiring federal intellectual property without 
opting into the federal intellectual property system as defined in Section 101(3).  IPRRA § 111(a).  
The federal intellectual property system encompasses the protection and enforcement of federal in-
tellectual property laws, including through the award of damages, injunctions and declaratory relief.  
IPRRA § 101(3).  Section 111(b) provides that in order for a state to opt into the federal intellectual 
property system as required under § 111(a), the state provide an assurance under procedures estab-
lished in § 131-137 that the state will waive its sovereign immunity in any action brought under fed-
eral intellectual property laws.  IPRRA § 111(b). 
 167. IPRRA § 111(b). 
 168. If a state asserts sovereign immunity for an action under federal intellectual property laws, 
it will be deemed to have breached its assurance if the assertion of immunity is not withdrawn with-
in sixty days.  IPRRA § 112.  To deter such breaches, § 113(a) states that intellectual property ap-
plications which contain an assurance of waiver and that are pending on the date of the breach are 
deemed abandoned and not subject to revival.  IPRRA § 113(a).  Also, a state may not collect dam-
ages or other monetary relief under the federal intellectual property right that is or has been owned 
by the state within five years of the date of the breach.  IPRRA § 113(b).  Further, states will be 
barred from opting back into the federal intellectual property system for one year from the date of 
the breach.  IPRRA § 113(c). 
 169. See supra notes 36-129 and accompanying text. 
 170. See Peters Testimony, supra note 19.  “Equity and common sense tell us that one who 
chooses to enjoy the benefits of a law-whether it be a federal grant or the multimillion-dollar bene-
fits of intellectual property protections-should also bear its burdens.”  145 CONG. REC. S13552-04, 
S13557 (1999) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
 171. I agree that it is within the power of Congress to condition a State’s permit to engage in 
the interstate transportation business on a waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity from suits aris-
ing out of such business. Congress might well determine that allowing regulable conduct such as the 
operation of a railroad to be undertaken by a body legally immune from liability directly resulting 
from these operations is so inimical to the purposes of its regulation that the State must be put to  the 
option of either foregoing participation in the conduct or consenting to legal responsibility for injury 
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support the IPRRA approach.  Even with the law on its side, the IPRRA 
might still need more to be found constitutional. 
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity has reached far beyond 
its textual boundaries to preclude virtually all suits against unconsenting 
states.  While the inherent sovereignty of the states is often credited for 
this expansive view of the Eleventh Amendment, modern Eleventh 
Amendment jurisprudence can simply be boiled down to policy concerns 
trumping the law.  To pass constitutional muster, the IPRRA needs sup-
port of not only the law, but needs to preserve the policies behind the 
modern interpretation of the state sovereign immunity doctrine.  As ex-
plained below, the IPRRA will in fact satisfy the law and preserve the 
policies of the Eleventh Amendment. 
A.  IPRRA Is Not An Abrogation of a State’s Sovereign Immunity 
The stringent requirements172 for congressional abrogation of a 
state’s sovereign immunity is simply no longer an issue under the 
IPRRA.173  Under the IPRRA, the elimination of the state sovereign im-
munity bar occurs not through Congressional abrogation, but rather 
though a voluntary and knowing waiver by the state. 
B.  IPRRA Provides a Valid Method to Induce Waiver by the States 
As waiver represents a valid exception to the state sovereign im-
munity doctrine,174 states can not complain that the IPRRA violates their 
defense of immunity before the federal courts.  The waiver of a state’s 
sovereign immunity constitutes a waiver of a constitutional right.175  As 
such, this waiver of immunity must meet a higher standard than waivers 
of other rights.  Particularly, the waiver must be both knowing and vol-
untary. 
The only challenge that might arise regarding the waiver theory un-
                                                          
caused thereby. 
Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. State Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184, 198 (1964) (White, J., dissenting). 
 172. See supra notes 138-146 and accompanying text. 
 173. “Abrogate” means “[t]o annul, cancel, revoke, repeal, or destroy.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 4 (abridged 6th ed. 1991).  The IPRRA leaves the state’s sovereign immunity intact.  
No state is precluded from raising an immunity defense at any time, even after opting into the 
IPRRA.  The fact that Congress may choose to condition the receipt of federal intellectual property 
by states upon the state assuring that it will waive its immunity at some future point doe not “annul, 
cancel, revoke, repeal, or destroy” the sovereign immunity of any state. 
 174. See supra  notes 130-137 and accompanying text. 
 175. But see Hamrick, supra note 11, at 874-75 (arguing waiver of Eleventh Amendment sov-
ereign immunity is a waiver of a jurisdiction right, not necessarily a constitutional right, and there-
fore the higher standard does not apply). 
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der the IPRRA is the issue of coercion.  States could argue that, while 
they knowingly176 waived their immunity, it was coerced and therefore 
involuntary.  However, the coercion argument is ineffective with respect 
to the Patent Act.177  Congress is free to condition the grant of a patent 
on certain conditions as it sees fit, so long as the legislation promotes the 
advancement of science and techonology. 
C.  Congress Can Enact IPRRA Under Congress’ Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 3 Powers 
It is well established that Congress has plenary power under the Pa-
tent and Copyright Clause.178  The only limitation placed upon Congress 
when acting under the authority of the Patent and Copyright Clause is 
that the legislation must “promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts.”179  Given Congress’ plenary power, Congress is free to condition 
the issuance of a patent on the compliance with specific requirements,180 
                                                          
 176. There will be no issue of whether the waiver of immunity was knowingly made.  The 
IPRRA procedures for providing an assurance of waiver eliminates this argument’s viability. 
 177. As Congress had plenary power to enact patent statutes and is able to condition the issu-
ance of a patent, a state cannot be coerced by Congress withholding issuance of a patent to a state 
unless a state meets certain criteria.  Cf. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (allowing Con-
gress to condition receipt of federal funds upon state meeting certain conditions so long as the con-
dition is in the pursuit of the public welfare and is done in an unambiguous manner). 
  College Savings Bank discusses that forced waiver based on a state’s conduct is not suffi-
cient to abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity.  College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 684-85. (1999).  The IPRRA is readily distinguishable from the 
issue in College Savings Bank.  The IPRRA does not limit a state’s conduct and does not explicitly 
punish it for its conduct.  States are free to infringe patents and have the Eleventh Amendment de-
fense available, however, if states wish to receive rights in additional intellectual property, they 
must opt-in and waive their immunity.  As Congress is not required to issue patents to parties who 
fail to comply with the Patent Act’s statutory provisions, Congress can choose to not allow states to 
receive patents absent their opting-in.  By not forcing the state to limit its activities, the IPRRA 
avoids the problems discussed in College Savings Bank. 
 178. Boyden v. Commissioner of Patents, 441 F.2d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1971).  Cf. Thomas M. 
Clark, Note, More Plenary Than Thou: A Post-Welch Compromise Theory of Congressional Power 
to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1022 (1988) (arguing that Congress re-
tained abrogation authority under the inherently limited powers of Article I, such as those powers 
under the Patent and Copyright Clause). 
 179. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 180. “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, 
subject to the conditions and requirements of [the Patent Act].”  35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). 
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966); Owen v. Paramount Productions, 41 F. Supp. 557 
(S.D. Cal 1941); Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972). 
Congress has already provided several strict conditions in the Patent Act.  Section 101 limits patent-
able subject matter.  35 U.S.C. §101 (1994).  Section 102 requires that patented inventions be novel.  
35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).  Obvious inventions are barred from being patented under Section 103.  35 
U.S.C. § 103 (1994). 
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including a requirement that the party receiving the federal intellectual 
property be amenable to suit. 
Additionally, patents are not issued as of right.181  No one has a 
constitutional right to receive a patent.  Furthermore, the Patent and 
Copyright clause is permissive; it does not command Congress to grant 
patents, but merely permits it.182  Congress has authority under the Pa-
tent and Copyright Clause to prescribe to whom and on what terms and 
conditions a patent will issue.183 
D.  IPRRA Does Promote the “Progress of Science and the useful Arts” 
The opt-in procedure of the IPRRA does “promote the Progress of 
Science and the useful Arts.”184  States constitute one of the largest po-
tential markets many inventors will have for their inventions, and in 
some cases, the only potential market.185  To allow a state to infringe a 
patent without a remedy for the inventor removes a large portion of the 
inventor’s potential market,186 and would significantly chill the inven-
tor’s incentive to create.  By providing a real monetary remedy against 
infringing states, inventor’s creative energies will not be dampened and 
society as a whole will continue to benefit from the creation of new and 
improved technologies.187 
                                                          
 181. “A patent constitutes a ‘gift or gratuity’ bestowed by the federal government, and if Con-
gress has conditioned its receipt on a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity to a declaratory 
suit, then Congress has acted permissibly.” New Star Lasers, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 63 
F. Supp.2d 1240, 1244 (E.D. Cal. 1999). 
 182. Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1120, 1124 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). 
 183. Owen v. Heimann, 12 F.2d 173, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1926); Rubbermaid Inc. v. Contico Int’l, 
Inc., 381 F. Supp. 666, 668 (E.D. Mo. 1974). 
 184. See K Kalan, Property Rights, Individual Rights, and the Viability of Patent Law Systems, 
71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1439, 1453 (2000) (“[P]rotection of intellectual property rights leads to innova-
tion and technological advancement.”). 
 185. For example, if an inventor were to invent a device that would allow police to safely stop 
a fleeing automobile during a high-speed pursuit, much of the demand for such a device would like-
ly come from state police agencies that would be protected by the Eleventh Amendment. 
 186. See Peter S. Menell, Economic Implications of State Sovereign Immunity From Infringe-
ment of Federal Intellectual Property Rights, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1399, 1399 (2000) (charactering 
the “fifty states and their myriad agencies and institutions” as a “significant class of consumers of 
intellectual property”). 
 187. “[E]nhancing the scope or enforceability of intellectual property rights increases the ex-
pected reward to those engaged in intellectual work, thereby spurring intellectual creativity and the 
exploitation of works.  Inversely, impediments to the enforcement of the intellectual property rights 
or limitations on remedies reduce this reward stream and opportunity for exploitation, thereby 
dampening the incentives of those who engage in creative enterprise.”  Menell, supra note 186, at 
1399.  See also Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 
1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2189 (2000) (stating the growth of intellectually property law is 
“closely intertwined with new technologies”). 
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Congress has plenary authority as to all matters affecting the issu-
ance of patents188 and may set forth conditions that must be satisfied be-
fore a patent will issue.189  The Constitution does not mandate that pa-
tents issue,190 rather, it merely gives Congress the authority to issue 
patents on such terms as Congress sees fit191 subject only to the limita-
tion that the issued patent promote science and technology.192  Further, 
the states could not complain about “special” requirements being placed 
on them,193 as the Patent and Copyright Clause does not have the re-
quirement of uniformity that other clauses of Article I, Section 8 have.194 
 
                                                          
 188. Grob v. Continental Machine Specialties, Inc., 283 N.W. 774, 774 (Minn. 1939); Boyden 
v. Commissioner of Patents, 441 F.2d 1041, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
 189. “Within the scope established by the Constitution, Congress may set out conditions and 
tests for patentability.”  Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).  See also Rubbermaid, 
Inc. v. Contico Int’l, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 666, 668 (E.D. Mo. 1974); McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. 
202 (1843).  At present, utility, novelty and nonobviousness are the three requirements for a patent 
to issue.  Congress would seemingly be free to add a fourth criteria, such as, amenability to suit or 
waiver of immunity.  “Incident to [the Patent Clause powers], Congress may attach conditions on 
the receipt of exclusive intellectual property rights.  Indeed, [Congress has] always attached certain 
conditions . . . in order to obtain a patent.”  145 CONG. REC. S13552-04, S13557 (1999) (statement 
of Sen. Leahy). 
 190. The Patent Clause of the Constitution “empowers but does not command the Congress to 
grant patent rights.”  Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1120, 1124 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).  See 
also Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 525-26 (1972).  “[T]here is no inherent 
entitlement to federal intellectual property rights.”  145 Cong. Rec. S13552-04, S13557 (1999) 
(statement of Sen. Leahy).  Patent rights exist solely by virtue of statute.  Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. 
Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964). 
 191. “The right to a patent is purely statutory and Congress has full power to prescribe to 
whom and upon what conditions a patent shall issue.”  Owen v. Heimann, 12 F.2d 173, 174 (D.C. 
Cir. 1926).  “No person has a vested right to a patent . . . but is privileged to seek the protected mo-
nopoly only upon compliance with the conditions which Congress has imposed.”  Boyden v. Com-
missioner of Patents, 441 F.2d 1041, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
 192. “Congress having created the [patent] monopoly, may put such limitations upon it as it 
pleases.”  Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 494 (1900).  See Healey, supra note 
9, at 1771 (stating that Congress “must” be able to enforce patent laws against the state to achieve 
the purpose of the Patent Act). 
 193. “The right to a patent is purely statutory and Congress has full power to prescribe to 
whom and upon what terms and conditions a patent shall issue.”  Owen v. Heimann, 12 F.2d 173, 
176 (D.C. Cir. 1926). 
  If Congress is to have any power with respect to patents, it must have the power to pre-
serve the rights accompanying the patent.  The essence of a patent is the right to exclude others.  
United States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202 (1913). 
  In his Atascadero dissent, Justice Brennan noted that the goal of the current Eleventh 
Amendment doctrine seems to be to obstruct Congress’ ability to exercise its powers in an otherwise 
unexceptional manner and a manner well within the reach of its Article I powers.  Atascadero State 
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 255 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 194. Radio Position Finding Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 205 F. Supp. 850, 857 (D. Md. 1962). 
26
Akron Law Review, Vol. 35 [2002], Iss. 3, Art. 5
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol35/iss3/5
WHITE1.DOC 1/22/2021  3:45 PM 
2002] PROTECTING PATENT OWNERS FROM INFRINGEMENT BY THE STATES 557 
E.  Courts Should Defer to Congressional Policy Absent Constitutional 
Violation 
Furthermore, in interpreting the IPRRA, courts should give defer-
ence to the legislative policy Congress has chosen.  Traditionally, Amer-
ican courts have passed on the opportunity to decide on the wisdom and 
utility of legislation and have deferred to the choices of the legislature.195 
F.  IPRRA Is In the Public Interest 
Deciding how strong to make patent rights requires a delicate bal-
ancing.196  This delicate balancing, however, favors granting patentees a 
right to pursue an infringement action against state entities and to recov-
er monetary damages.197  Patents and their accompanying rights are the 
life-blood of a strong economy198 and are essential for inventors to be 
competitive in the marketplace.199  The value of patents in the modern 
                                                          
 195. “Under the system of government created by [the U.S.] Constitution, it is up to legisla-
tures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation.”  Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 
726, 729 (1963).  “[C]ourts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of 
legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.”  Id. at 730. 
 196.  
If the level of intellectual property protection is too low, negative effects follow. Pro-
spective authors turn to other careers. Drug companies decrease investment in research 
and development. Yet every intellectual property right granted diminishes the public 
domain of freely available material. If intellectual property rights are set too high, future 
creators will be deprived of the raw materials they use to create new works. For example, 
could Bill Gates have created MS-DOS if  BASIC and CP/M had been proprietary sys-
tems protected by an expansive intellectual property regime? We must remember that the 
system is not a linear function with each additional property right producing a corre-
sponding increase in future production. It is just as dangerous to produce a system with 
too much intellectual property protection as one with too little. Each proposed expansion 
(and even the current state) of intellectual property rights should be approached with the 
same skepticism as any other state-backed monopoly. We should ask whether the mo-
nopoly has been shown to be necessary. We should worry about all of the effects of en-
forcement of the monopoly, not just the diminishing public domain but also possible side 
effects on free speech, competition in information products, and privacy. We should see 
whether there are other available ways for creators to receive a return adequate to pro-
mote future investment. 
James Boyle, Intellectual Property Policy Online: A Young Person’s Guide, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
47, 49 (1996). 
 197. The current state of the law, where a private patentee is forced to seek a state waiver or 
attempt to find a viable state law theory to pursue, does not advance the public policy of the Patent 
and Copyright Clause.  Young, supra note 13, at 510.  “As a matter of public policy and fairness, 
states should not be immune from any suit arising under patent law.”  Healey, supra note 9, at 1771. 
 198. “Intellectual property is the currency of the new global economy.”  145 CONG. REC. 
S13552-04, S13558 (1999) (statement of Sen. Leahy).  “Intellectual property plays an increasingly 
important role in the modern economy.”  Wied, supra note 154, at 469. 
 199.  
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world cannot be understated.200  Patent rights provide the incentive for 
individuals and corporations to strive to create new and useful goods for 
the benefit of society201 as a whole.202  Additionally, the disclosure of the 
technology behind the patented invention required by the Patent Act 
provides for geometrical growth of the various sciences, as other inven-
tors will feed off of the disclosures made in the issued patent.203  The 
                                                          
Innovation and creativity have been the fuel of our national economic boom over the 
past decade.  The United States now leads the world in computing, communications and 
biotechnologies . . . .  Our national prosperity is, first and foremost, a tribute to American 
ingenuity.  But it is also a tribute to the wisdom of our Founding Fathers, who made the 
promotion of what they called “Science and the Useful Arts” a national project, which 
they constitutionally assigned to Congress.  And it is no less of a tribute to the successive 
Congresses and Administrations of both parties who have striven to provide real incen-
tives and rewards for innovation and creativity by providing strong and even-handed 
protection to intellectual property rights. 
145 CONG. REC. S13552-04, S13556 (1999) (statement of Sen. Leahy).  “[O]ur national economy 
depends on real and effective intellectual property rights.”  Id. 
 200. “We are living in a world of increasingly complicated and transient technology, a world 
that lends itself to scientific achievements capable of fundamentally altering the human condition.  
Intellectual property law, especially patent law, is instrumental to the advancement of this technolo-
gy.”  Craig Allen Nard, Legitimacy and the Useful Arts, 10  HARV. J.L. & TECH. 515, 515-16 
(1997). 
[I]ntellectual property is more importantly for the development of cultural and civil life 
than real property . . . [P]rotection of the expression of ideas, whether they are scientific 
inventions, literary works, or commercial trademarks, is the key goal of intellectual 
property.  Such protection allows for individual and societal flourishing and for the de-
velopment of means of dissent and expression against state governments. 
Shubha Ghosh, Toward a Theory of Regulatory Takings for Intellectual Property: The Path Left 
Open After College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 637, 640 (2000).  
However, current Eleventh Amendment law “erodes the current value of patents.”  Harper, supra 
note 92, at 22. 
 201. “[T]he legal rules vesting property interests in the creators of intellectual properties leads 
to the production of works that benefit society.”  Beryl R. Jones, Copyrights and State Liability, 76 
IOWA L. REV. 701, 732 (1991).  The basis for intellectual property laws is “that a community bene-
fits when it encourages its creative and inventive people by honoring the products of their minds.”  
Robert W. Sherwood, Human Creativity For Economic Development: Patents Propel Technology, 
33 AKRON L. REV. 351, 354 (2000). 
 202. See Healey, supra note 9, at 1771, 1771 n.243 (stating that “Congress must enforce valid 
patent rights as an incentive for inventors to continue to develop technologies”); Randall S. Hersom, 
Note, The Constitutionality of the Intellectual Property Remedy Clarification Acts and the Awards 
of Relief, 16 J. CORP. L. 521, 525 (1991) (stating that without the exclusive right to control use of 
patented inventions, inventors have little incentive to invest in the development of new technologies 
or to reveal those technologies to the public).  Cf. Jones, supra note 201, at 731-32 (discussing in-
centives for creation of beneficial works under federal copyright law and the deleterious effect of 
not allowing remedies to protect those works from infringement). 
 203. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (“The specification [in the patent application] shall contain a 
written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it. . . .”).  
See General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938) (stating underlying 
purpose of disclosure requirement is to ensure underlying invention is ultimately dedicated to pub-
lic). 
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continued existence of strong patent rights, including the availability of a 
real remedy against the states, is in the public interest.204 
Infringement by the states has not been a serious problem.205  It 
would appear that few, if any, inventors206 have had their creative ener-
gies thwarted by the unavailability of a remedy against state infring-
ers.207  However, the IPRRA seeks to nip the state infringement problem 
in the bud.  Providing a solution to a potentially serious problem in its 
infancy makes infinitely more sense than seeking to remedy a problem 
only after it has become a serious concern.208 
                                                          
 204. “It is the public interest which is dominant in the patent system.”  Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-
Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665 (1994).  See also Young, supra note 13, at 510 (stating the 
current situation patent owners find themselves in when states infringe, i.e., either seeking a state to 
waive its sovereign immunity or being forced to rely upon a state law ground, does not advance the 
public policy set forth in the Patent Clause).  “As a matter of public policy and fairness, states 
should not be immune from any suit arising under patent law.”  Healey, supra note 9, at 1771.  Cf. 
New Star Lasers, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 63 F. Supp.2d 1240, 1244 (E.D. Cal. 1999) 
(“Without the judicial enforcement provided by the national government, a patent would have little 
or no value . . . .”).  “[P]atent policy is the province of Congress, not the federal courts.”  Cf. Harper, 
supra note 92, at 25.  State infringement of patent rights might result in short term benefits to the 
public, but those benefits would quickly disappear into a long-term detriment.  Hersom, supra note 
202, at 525-26. 
 205. A search for cases involving patent infringement by a state or an arm of the state turns up 
only a handful of cases.  E.g.,  Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Jacobs Wind 
Elec. Co., Inc. v. Florida Dep’t of Transp., 919 F.2d 726 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 206. However, this may be because few, if any, inventors would have contemplated that exclu-
sive rights in a patent were not exclusive as to a state.  “It would also surprise our citizens to learn 
that their exclusive rights to a patent was not exclusive and that governmental units could infringe 
upon that right.”  Lemelson v. Ampex Corp., 372 F. Supp. 708, 712 (N.D. Ill. 1974). 
 207.  
The issue is not whether State infringement has been frequent in the past, but rather 
whether we can assure American inventors and investors and our design trading partners 
that, as State involvement in intellectual property becomes ever greater in the new in-
formation economy, U.S. intellectual property rights are backed by guaranteed legal 
remedies. 
145 CONG. REC. S13552-04, S13556 (1999) (statement of Sen. Leahy).  “The legal landscape is 
surely one of the facts accessed in . . . a cost-benefit analysis and one would expect it to add to the 
incentives and disincentives that must be taken into account before a rational actor enters the com-
mercial arena.”  Hamrick, supra note 11, at 874.  But see Nelson, supra note 4, at 313 (stating that 
state sovereign immunity will make “few inventors [willing to] expend the effort and resources to 
develop inventions for which they might not be compensated”). 
 208. When questioned by Rep. Kastenmeier about the timeliness of the PRCA, then Acting 
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks Jeffrey M. Samuels had this to say: 
There have not been many cases that have raised [the issue of sovereign immunity in the 
patent context.]  [Providing a remedy against state infringers] is a step that should be 
taken not because the possibility exists in light of Atascadero and in light of the Chew 
case that more States will get involved in infringing patents.  I guess as a general policy 
statement, we believe that those engaged – those who do engage in patent infringement 
should be subject to all the remedies that are set forth in the Patent Act and that the rights 
of a patent owner should not be dependent upon the identity of the entity who is infring-
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Providing a remedy against the states will send a message to Amer-
ica’s innovators and inventors that spending time, money, and energy to 
develop new intellectual property is a worthwhile endeavor that will be 
rewarded with a patent that no party will be able to infringe.209 
G.  IPRRA Discourages State Malfeasance 
It is often argued that state accountability for federal intellectual 
property rights violations is much ado about nothing.  However, as the 
number of patents exponentially increases,210 infringement by the states 
is likely to become a more significant problem.211 
One need not cite to authority to support the proposition that states 
should not infringe patents owned by private individuals.  So simple and 
fundamental a proposition can hardly be found elsewhere in the law.  By 
failing to hold states accountable for patent infringement,212 states are 
implicitly encouraged to infringe patents as they have their only real de-
terrent, monetary damages, removed.213 
As states have no authority to violate patent laws,214 they can hardly 
                                                          
ing, whether it be a private individual or corporation, or State. 
Patent Remedy Clarification Act: Hearing on H.R. 3886 before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intel-
lectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 101st 
Cong., 2d Sess., 32 (1990). 
 209. Otherwise, failure to provide this remedy to private patentees places them at a distinct 
disadvantage.  Sovereign immunity “when allied with the pressures of a competitive marketplace, 
could place the State’s regulated private competitors at a significant disadvantage.”  College Sav. 
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 695 (1999) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 210. See supra note 20. 
 211. “[S]ome states and some State entities and officials have infringed patents . . . in the past, 
and the massive growth of both intellectual property and State participation in intellectual property 
that we are seeing as we move into the next century give ample cause for concern that such viola-
tion swill continue.”  145 CONG. REC. S13552, S13557 (1999) (statement of Sen. Leahy).  Cf. Har-
per, supra note 92, at 22 (stating that increased pressure on governmental entities to cut costs will 
lead to continued if not increased infringement of material protected by federal copyright laws).  Cf. 
Schoenfeld, supra note 11, at 191 (stating that Eleventh Amendment immunity will encourage states 
to infringe copyrighted materials). 
 212. See Harper, supra note 92, at 22 (“The interaction of exclusive federal court jurisdiction 
over copyright infringement suits and state immunity from federal court litigation combined to pro-
vide states with a penalty-free opportunity to infringe copyrights.”). 
 213. Edelman prohibits retroactive monetary judgments against states.  “A damage award may 
often be the only practical remedy available to the plaintiff, and the threat of a damages award may 
be the only effective deterrent to a defendant’s willful violation of federal law.”  Atascadero State 
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 234, 256-57 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Providing a monetary 
damages remedy will deter states from infringing federal intellectual property rights.  Harper, supra 
note 92, at 22. 
 214. Lemelson v. Ampex Corp., 372 F. Supp. 708, 711 (N.D. Ill. 1974).  One commentator has 
referred to a state’s ability to escape liability under the Patent Act as ‘legalized thievery.’  Qazi, su-
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complain that the IPRRA is violative of their rights.  A state’s sovereign 
immunity does not, and should not, extend to acts outside of the scope of 
its legitimate authority.215 
States and their entities are significant participants in the patent and 
intellectual property markets.216  States and the “arms of states” should 
be held to a higher standard.  At the very least, states should be held to 
the same standard as private actors.217  Governments who are permitted 
to commit infringement essentially have a license to commit torts against 
private patent owners.218  This would never be acceptable in any other 
context. 
H.  Sovereign Immunity Policies Do Not Support State Immunity in 
Patent Context 
The “hodgepodge of confusing and intellectually indefensible 
judge-made law”219 surrounding the Eleventh Amendment is no longer 
appropriate, assuming it ever was, in light of the current relationship be-
tween federal and state governments.220  The policy of the Patent Act 
                                                          
pra note 9, at 804. 
 215. Lemelson argues that an uncompensated infringement of a private party’s patent consti-
tutes an unconstitutional taking and therefore outside of the state’s legitimate authority and as such 
sovereign immunity should not exempt the state for infringing a patent.  Lemelson v. Ampex Corp., 
372 F. Supp. 708, 711 (N.D. Ill. 1974). 
 216. Qazi, supra note 9, at 804.  Cf. Harper, supra note 92, at 22 (stating that entities having 
Eleventh Amendment immunity purchase over $1 billion dollars of copyrighted material). 
 217. “We can probably all agree that when a State, or a State agency or an officer or employee 
of a State acting in an official capacity, infringes a copyright or another federal intellectual property 
right, the State should be held accountable for that infringement just as any other person or entity 
would be.”  Peters Testimony, supra note 19.  “Because states reap the benefits of patent laws, these 
laws should be applied equally to states, companies, and individuals.”  Healey, supra note 9, at 
1772-73. 
 218. Root v. Railway, 105 U.S. 189 (1882), Carbice Corp. of Am. v. American Patents Dev. 
Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931).  Patent infringement is a tort analogous to trespass.  Heath v. A.B. Dick, 
253 F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1958). 
 219. Gibbons, supra note 32, at 1891. 
 220. “The difficulty, however, in adhering to the traditional interpretation of Hans and its 
progeny is the lack of substantive arguments supporting state sovereign immunity that remain viable 
in the twentieth century.”  Weitzman, supra note 15, at 332.  Cf. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Pre-
paid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 694-95 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting)  (stat-
ing a state’s need to invoke sovereign immunity is “unusually weak” where a state is acting in a 
commercial and non-governmental role). 
If the Court’s Eleventh Amendment doctrine were grounded on principles essential to 
the structure of our federal system or necessary to protect the cherished constitutional 
liberties of our people, the doctrine might be unobjectionable; the interpretation of the 
text of the Constitution in light of changed circumstances and unforeseen events – and 
with full regard for the purposes underlying the text – has always been the unique role of 
[the Supreme] Court.  But the Court’s Eleventh Amendment doctrine diverges from text 
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and the exclusive federal jurisdiction for actions arising under the Patent 
Act are sound and well established.  The Patent Act seeks to promote 
science by awarding a successful patent applicant a right to exclude all 
others from practicing the patented invention.  These strong policies are 
not counterbalanced by the policy of the state sovereign immunity.221 
The impetus of the Eleventh Amendment is the prevention of feder-
al court judgments that must be paid out of a state’s treasury.222  This 
justification for sovereign immunity seems insincere.  State treasuries 
routinely pay monetary damage awards for causes of action under state 
or federal law if brought by the federal government.223  The possibility 
of a state being bankrupted by being subject to the same federal laws as 
is any other private actor seems quite ridiculous.224  The Alden Court 
was not willing to assume that states are willing to disregard the federal 
Constitution or refuse to obey valid federal laws.225  Furthermore, “the 
injunctive relief that is permitted can often be more intrusive – and more 
expensive – than a simple damages award would be.”226 
Not only does the Eleventh Amendment seek to prevent federal 
courts from ordering judgments to be paid to private parties out of state 
treasuries, it also serves to avoid the “indignity” of subjecting states to 
the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the insistence of private par-
ties.227  While a state might truly be embarrassed if found liable for pa-
tent infringement, this policy concern, if appropriate at all,228 is substan-
                                                          
and history virtually without regard to underlying purposes or genuinely fundamental in-
terests. 
Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 247-48 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 221. “[T]he widely accepted view among modern nations [is] that when a State engages in or-
dinary commercial activity sovereign immunity has no significant role to play.”  College Sav. Bank, 
527 U.S. at 699 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  See also Lane v. First Nat’l Bank, 871 F.2d 166, 173 (1st 
Cir. 1989) (recognizing policy of Copyright Act is weightier than policy of state sovereign immuni-
ty for actions arising under the Copyright Act) 
 222. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, (1996); Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 
513 U.S. 30 (1994); Huecker v. Milburn, 538 F.2d 1241 (6th Cir. 1976). 
 223. The Eleventh Amendment presents no barrier to suit by the United States against any 
State.  United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965).  One state may sue another state 
without its consent.  Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 328 (1934). 
 224. See Schoenfeld, supra note 11, at 191 (stating that enabling individuals to sue states for 
copyright infringement “will not place a great burden on the states or their treasuries”).  But see 
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 750 (1999). (“Private suits against nonconsenting States – especially 
suits for money damages – may threaten the financial integrity of the States.”). 
 225. Alden, 527 U.S. at 754-55. 
 226. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 257 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 227. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Sherwinski v. Peterson, 98 F.3d 849 (5th 
Cir. 1996); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887). 
 228. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 93-95 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the Framers did not intend the courts to preserve a state’s dignity, but rather intended 
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tially outweighed by the need to provide private patentees with a remedy 
against infringing states. 
An additional policy is to allow states to control their own public 
policy and administration of internal affairs.229  The essence of this ar-
gument is that states would never be able to fulfill their responsibilities 
to their citizens if they were continually forced to explain themselves 
and their actions in a court of law.230  As to purely governmental affairs, 
this justification may be valid.  However, when states engage in com-
mercial activity outside the sphere of pure governmental function, the 
ability of the state to provide for its people would not be affected.231 
IV.  OTHER REMEDIES 
The failure of the IPRRA to pass judicial scrutiny or its inability to 
gain the requisite votes to become a law should not sound the death knell 
in the attempt to hold infringing states liable for that patent infringe-
ment.232  It might be that state infringement never becomes an issue and 
all will be well.  However, if the issue makes it to the court system 
again, courts should take the opportunity to rethink past precedent.233  
                                                          
the normal operation of the legislative process and the procedural safeguards included therein to 
guard state interests). 
 229. Blake v. Kline, 612 F.2d 718 (3d Cir. 1979); Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Im-
munity and Accountability, 37  CASE W. RES. L. REV. 396, 398 (1987).  But see 146 CONG. REC. 
S7758 (2000) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (stating that recent Supreme Court decisions on sovereign 
immunity have extended the doctrine “not just to essential organs of State government, but also to a 
wide range of State-funded or State-controlled entities and commercial ventures.”) 
  Under Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), the real policy 
concern is striking the proper balance between state sovereignty as reflected in the Eleventh 
Amendment and its interpretations with the supremacy of the federal Constitution and laws. 
 230. Monaghan, supra note 126, at 124. 
 231. “When a state engages in ordinary commercial ventures, it acts like a private person, out-
side the area of its ‘core’ responsibilities, and in a way unlikely to prove essential to the fulfillment 
of a basic governmental obligation.”  College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. 
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 694 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 232. See Harper, supra note 92, at 25 (stating that if Congress does not remedy the state in-
fringement problem, patent owners will continue to suffer economic harm). 
 233. Kurt E. Springmann, The Impact of Seminole on Intellectual Property Infringement By 
State Actors: The Interaction of Article I, Article III, the Eleventh Amendment, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 889, 889 (1997).  A starting point in a reanalysis of the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment since Hans v. Louisiana might be the numerous 
dissents of Justice Brennan.  Justice Brennan has attacked the rule of Hans in most every Eleventh 
Amendment case handed down.  See, e.g., Welch v. Texas Dep’t of Pub. Highways & Pub. Transp., 
483 U.S. 468 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Papasan v. Alain, 478 U.S. 265, 293 (1986) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 78 (1985) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 248 (1985) (Brennan., J., dis-
senting).  Brennan’s dissenting opinions argue that the Article III of the Constitution never intended 
to preserve State sovereignty in cases arising under federal law and that the Eleventh Amendment 
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The thought of states being able to violate property rights of resident and 
non-resident citizens is repugnant to the American system of property.  
Sovereign immunity, at least within the context of patent infringement, 
is an antiquated and unnecessary doctrine.234  Of course courts simply 
cannot ignore the principles of the Eleventh Amendment;235 however a 
more liberal approach to issues such as waiver or implied consent can 
accomplish the necessary ends without violating a state’s sovereign im-
munity or the text of the Eleventh Amendment.236  The courts should not 
give constitutional status to a nontextual, common-law doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity and then use this status to deny the federal government 
the right to exercise powers expressly given to Congress by the states.237 
Another possible solution would be for Congress to remove the 
federal judiciary’s exclusive jurisdiction over issues arising under the 
Patent Act.  However, this solution would likely cause more problems 
than it would remedy.238  But, given that trademark law and unfair com-
                                                          
creates an immunity defense only in the specific situation encountered in the Amendment itself, i.e., 
suits between a State and citizens of another State.  Id.; Althouse, supra note 163, at 1127-29.  Fur-
thermore, Brennan argues that the surrender of a portion of their sovereignty to Congress in Article 
I, sovereignty does not exist with respect to federal laws passed under the authority of Article I.  
Stare decisis is perverted when relied upon as a defense for deliberate violations of well-established 
federal law.  Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 98 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 234. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
 235. However, allowing Congress to more readily abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity pur-
suant, particularly in light of the broad interpretation of the Commerce Clause, might render the 
Eleventh Amendment a nullity.  Weitzman, supra note 15, at 333. 
 236. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 248 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that it might be time for 
the Court to reexamine its Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence in light of the modern federal sys-
tem). 
  Taking a more liberal approach would requiring overruling numerous recent Supreme 
Court cases.  This attack on precedent should not stand in the way of revisiting the Eleventh 
Amendment.  As Chief Justice Taney said: 
I do not, however, object to the revision of [a question he had believed decided by earlier 
cases], and am quite willing that it be regarded hereafter as the law of this court, that its 
opinion upon the construction of the Constitution is always open to discussion when it is 
supposed to have been founded in error, and that its judicial authority should hereafter 
depend altogether on the force of the reasoning by which it is supported. 
Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 470 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting). 
 237. Herbert Hovenkamp, Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Federalism: The Supreme 
Court’s Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2213, 2238 (1996).  See also 
Cong. Rec. S7758-01, S7758 (2000) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (stating that the recent Supreme 
Court decisions, particularly, Alden, Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank, were “startling in 
their reasoning, casting aside the test of the Constitution, inferring broad immunities from abstract 
generalizations about the federalism, and second-guessing Congress’ reasoned judgment about the 
need for national remedial legislation.”). 
 238. For example, inexperienced state court judges would be ill equipped both legally and 
technically to handle complex patent infringement actions.  See Weitzman, supra note 15, at 334.  
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created to provide uniformity of the patent 
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petition laws coexist between the federal and state systems,239 double ju-
risdiction might be a potential remedy.240 
In the end, a Constitutional amendment may be the only way to re-
store federal intellectual property right protection, but it is unlikely that 
states will rush to ratify such an amendment.241 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The law of sovereign immunity, as it currently stands, constitutes a 
serious threat to a significant portion of the patent community.  The ina-
bility of private patent owners to recover past monetary damages against 
a state infringer has the potential to create a serious chilling effect on the 
development of new, improved, and beneficial technologies.  Further-
more, the inability of an individual or private company to seek a declara-
tory judgment against a state as a patent owner expands the monopoly of 
the Patent Act as to the state in a manner wholly inconsistent with the 
underlying purposes of the Act. 
The only textual legal authority for sovereign immunity is the Elev-
enth Amendment.  However, this Amendment, in clear and unambiguous 
language creates state immunity only in certain, specific circumstances.  
A liberal interpretation of the Amendment, as seen in cases from Hans to 
Seminole Tribe, creates weaknesses in federal law, particularly law that 
is exclusively federal, that are nearly insurmountable. 
If the IPRRA becomes law, it will serve to significantly, if not 
completely remedy the current sovereign immunity problem with respect 
to private patent owners.  Not only will the IPRRA provide a remedy, it 
will, more importantly, be able to survive judicial scrutiny.  The Patent 
and Copyright Clause provides a constitutional basis for Congress to en-
act the IPRRA.  Further, the strict abrogation doctrine of recent Supreme 
Court cases is completely avoided by requiring states to waive sovereign 
immunity or lose the right to obtain patent rights in the future.  This 
waiver, being a voluntary choice among several options, is clear, unam-
biguous, and noncoercive, and as such is a valid waiver of sovereign 
immunity. 
                                                          
law.  28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1994).  Joint state and federal jurisdiction would likely destroy that uni-
formity.  Weitzman, supra note 15, at 334.  But, would courts construe a waiver of immunity for 
causes of action arising under state law sufficient to subject a state to immunity in a state court for 
violation of a federal statute? 
 239. See Weitzman, supra note 15, at 334. 
 240. One solution might be to readily allow removal to the federal courts.  Another would be to 
allow suit in state court only when a State asserts sovereign immunity. 
 241. 145 CONG. REC. S13552-04, S13556 (1999) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
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